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Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech
Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou 1
Forthcoming in 48 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review no. 2 (2015)
Abstract
In Harris v. Quinn, the Supreme Court held that unionized home care workers
have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay their fair share of the cost of services that
the union is statutorily required to provide. The Court thus transformed what had been a
legislative debate about so-called right-to-work laws, which about half of states have
adopted, into a constitutional requirement for one narrow category of public sector
employees. The problem with transforming this policy argument into a First Amendment
requirement is that treating fair share payments to a union as compelled speech raises
First Amendment rights of both supporters and opponents of the union. If expenditures on
union representation are speech–as the majority in Harris thinks they are–then the
union’s obligation to provide free representation compels speech by the union and its
members. While, in our view, the requirement to pay for legal services is not compelled
speech, the Court’s entire agency fee jurisprudence, including Harris, insists that it is.
On the Court’s analysis, then, laws and contracts that require unionized employees to
pay for union representational services compel speech of dissenters exactly to the same
extent that their prohibition compels speech of unions and their members. Moreover, to
the extent that a union must rely on member dues that it would otherwise spend on
political activities to cover the costs of services for free riders, the duty of fair
representation owed to nonpayers would violate the First Amendment rights of the union
by siphoning off money that would otherwise be used to support these activities.
Accordingly, the Court must alter its usual analysis of the constitutionality of agency fee
agreements and recognize that union representation requires balancing competing
freedom of speech and association interests. Once the First Amendment rights of unions
and union members are recognized, agency fee or fair share provisions emerge as a
constitutionally sound accommodation of the interests of dissenters, unions, and union
members.

1

The authors are, respectively, Chancellor’s Professor of Law and a JD candidate at the University of
California, Irvine School of Law. They gratefully acknowledge comments from Nick Hartmann and
research assistance from Christina Tsou.

Published by The Keep, 2015

1

Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 10 [2015], Art. 74

I.

Introduction

In Harris v. Quinn, the Supreme Court held that unionized home care workers
have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay their fair share of the cost of services that
the union is statutorily required to provide. 2 The Court therefore invalidated a fair share
(or agency) fee provision of a collective bargaining agreement between Illinois and the
Service Employees International Union’s Illinois health care local (SEIU-HII)
representing home care workers paid with Medicaid funds. 3 The Court thus transformed
what had been a legislative debate about so-called right-to-work laws, which about half
of states have adopted, 4 into a constitutional requirement for one narrow category of
public sector employees.
Right-to-work laws have long been controversial. Supporters say they prevent
workers from being compelled to provide financial support to a union that they do not
want. 5 Critics insist that right-to-work laws compel unions and their dues-paying
members to expend money on behalf of nonmembers; they argue that if a majority of
employees choose union representation, everyone gets the benefits and everyone should
share in the costs. 6 The problem with transforming this policy argument into a First
Amendment requirement, we will explain, is that treating fair share payments to a union
as compelled speech raises First Amendment rights of both supporters and opponents of
the union. If expenditures on union representation are speech–as the majority in Harris
thinks they are, but, as we explain below, we do not–then the union’s obligation to
provide free representation compels speech by the union and its members.
Our argument comprises three interrelated contentions. First, unions possess First
Amendment rights as “expressive associations.” 7 The Court’s failure to recognize these
rights has led the Court to impose restrictions on how unions raise and spend money from
their stakeholders that corporations and other associations do not experience. And the
Court’s union dues objector cases are out of step with its campaign finance and freedom
of association jurisprudence. 8 Second, to the extent the Court continues to enable or
2

Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014).
Collective Bargaining Agreement, Ill. Dept. of Cent. Mgmt. Servs. (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www2.illinois.gov/cms/Employees/Personnel/Documents/emp_seiupast.pdf.
4
Right to Work Resources, Nat’l Conf. St. Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/rightto-work-laws-and-bills.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
5
See, e.g., AFL-CIO, Right to Work, available at http://www.aflcio.org/Legislation-and-Politics/StateLegislative-Battles/Ongoing-State-Legislative-Attacks/Right-to-Work
6
See, e.g., National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation Inc., Right to Work Frequently Asked
Questions, available at http://www.nrtw.org/b/rtw_faq.htm
7
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). See infra Section IV for a discussion of how unions
satisfy the criteria established in the Court’s expressive association jurisprudence beginning with Jaycees.
8
Others, including one of these authors, have previously examined the Court’s unequal treatment of the
speech rights of unions and corporations. See Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?
[unpublished paper available on SSRN]; Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and
Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1023 (2013); Benjamin I. Sachs,
Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 800 (2012);
3
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require states to prohibit unions from collecting agency fees, the duty of fair
representation in the right-to-work context, which forces unions and their members to pay
for legal and other services for non-paying workers, is unconstitutional on the Court’s
own analysis. While, in our view, the requirement to pay for legal services is not
compelled speech, the Court’s entire agency fee jurisprudence, including Harris, insists
that it is. On the Court’s analysis, then, laws and contracts that require unionized
employees to pay for union representational services compel speech of dissenters exactly
to the same extent that their prohibition compels speech of unions and their members.
Accordingly, and this is our third argument, the Court must alter its usual analysis of the
constitutionality of fair share fee agreements and recognize that union representation
requires balancing competing freedom of speech and association interests. The Court has
recognized that “unions have the right under the First Amendment to express their views
on political and social issues without government interference.” 9 In our view, agency fees
do not compel speech of union dissenters any more than the duty of fair representation
compels speech of unions in right-to-work states. But the Court thinks otherwise. Once
the First Amendment rights of unions and union members are recognized, agency fee or
fair share provisions – which allow unions to collect from every represented person the
pro rata cost of contract negotiation and administration but prohibit collecting fees for
expressive activity not germane to contract negotiation and administration -- emerge as a
constitutionally sound accommodation of the interests of dissenters, unions, and union
members.
The structure of this Article is as follows. First, in Part II, we explain Harris and
the dues-objector cases that preceded it. In Part III, we explain that fair share fees—
payment of money to an organization in exchange for services—should be held to raise
no viable First Amendment claim. In Part IV, we explore the First Amendment rights of
unions and their members and explain that if the payment of fees for contract negotiation
and administration is compelled speech, then it is equally compelled speech to require,
as Harris does, a union to expend money to negotiate and administer a contract on behalf
of free-riding nonpayers. In sum, the same First Amendment analysis that led the Court
to conclude that right-to-work is constitutionally compelled for home care workers leads
also to the conclusion that right-to-work laws are unconstitutional for other workers.
In Part V we consider union representation in the post-Harris world. In particular,
we explore the implications of Harris for the duty of fair representation, exclusivity, and
agency fees. Although agency-fee provisions were originally designed to protect the First
Amendment rights of nonmembers, once the First Amendment interests of unions and
union members are thrown into the mix, agency-fee provisions acquire even stronger
constitutional support. They protect three sets of interests simultaneously: nonmembers

Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech Rights? 53 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 1 (2011).
9
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295 (2012).
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from having to subsidize the political and ideological pursuits of the union, union
members from having to subsidize representational services for nonpaying nonmembers,
and unions who strive to protect their workers’ interests and can only do so when they are
able to fully participate in the political landscape. Rather than force unions and their
members to pay for services for nonpaying nonmembers (as Harris requires), or
nonmembers to pay for political activities by unions and their members (which, as we
explain, is not constitutionally objectionable), the reasonable compromise is the rule prior
to Harris in non-right-to-work states: the union must represent nonmembers, and
nonmembers can be required to pay only that portion of dues attributable to
representation.
Harris v. Quinn and the Origin of Fair Share Fees

II.
A.

The Background of Harris v. Quinn and the Law of Agency Fees
1. Unionization of Home Care Work

Home care work has been identified by the U.S. Department of Labor as one of
the fastest growing occupations. This growth has been fueled by an aging population that
desires to stay home longer and by the recognition that in-home care is more economic
than institutional care. 10 Like many other services—health care, fire protection, and the
protection of parks and open spaces—home care work was formerly provided privately or
through charity but became government-funded and government-regulated as
governments began to see the service as a public good rather than a private obligation.11
Today, almost every state pays for in-home care through the Medicaid program. 12 And,
thus, home care workers, like firefighters, teachers, librarians, and park rangers before
them, became government employees once the government started paying their wages
and asserting regulatory control over them. Illinois, along with many other states,
eventually chose to make state-funded home care workers part of the government
workforce. 13
The home care labor force, which is predominantly female and immigrant, 14
began to organize unions in the 1980s to improve wages and working conditions. In
10

Melanie Trottman & Kris Maher, Labor Department Adds Protection for Home-Health-Care Workers,
Wall
St.
J.
(Sept.
18,
2013,
12:05
AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323981304579081251516291502.
11
See Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Caring for America: Home Health Workers in the Shadow of
the Welfare State ch. 1 (2012).
12
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (citing Janet O’Keeffe et al. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., Understanding Medicaid Home and Community Services: A Primer (2010)).
13
See Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care Work in State Labor Law, 92 Minn. L.
Rev. 1390, 1403–04 (2008).
14
See Peggie R. Smith, Who Will Care for the Elderly?, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 323, 328–29 (2013).
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states that acknowledged the right of state-paid home care workers to unionize and
bargain collectively, the state agency that oversees home care work recognized that a
unionized labor force can ensure a higher caliber of service by reducing competition from
lower-paid and less-skilled providers. Illinois argued precisely this in Harris—that
unionization benefitted the state government by regularizing and rationalizing a labor
market for the twenty thousand workers in its Disabilities Program. The state and union
supporters argued that unionization benefited the recipients of care by facilitating the
training and recruitment of workers, and even critics of unions must concede that in
Illinois wages rose and health benefits were provided to home care workers as a result of
unionization.
Under the Illinois law at issue in Harris, a care recipient (called a customer) first
establishes, in consultation with his physician and a government program counselor, that
he is eligible for Medicaid-paid in-home care, and then selects and supervises the worker
(called a personal assistant) from the pool of people who meet the state program
requirements. The state determines the hourly wage and pays the personal assistant
directly, withholding income taxes. The state sets minimum requirements for personal
assistants, dictates the terms of the employment agreement, and requires personal
assistants to provide recommendations from past employers and have related work
experience or training. 15 A state-employed counselor works with the customer to develop
a service plan detailing the assistant’s job responsibilities, hours, and working conditions,
and also helps the customer conduct the state-mandated annual performance review of the
assistant and mediates disagreements between the customer and the assistant. 16 After
legal setbacks, Illinois amended its public sector labor law in 2003 to cover personal
assistants, who are state employees for purposes of collective bargaining. 17 A majority of
the workers chose to unionize, and since 2003 the SEIU-HII has negotiated three
successive collective bargaining agreements raising wages and improving working
conditions of the personal assistants. 18
Over the nine years from the first collective bargaining agreement in 2003 to the
current one, wages increased for home care workers in Illinois from $7 per hour to
$11.65 an hour, going up to $13 on December 1, 2014. Moreover, the agreements
provided health benefits through a fund designed and administered by the union, to which
the state contributes 75 cents an hour (for a total annual state contribution in 2013-2014
of $27 million). And the agreements established a state-funded training program
administered jointly by the state and the union, while also providing assistants with the
15

Id.; Ill. Admin. Code tit. 89, §§ 686.10, 686.40 (2013).
Ill. Admin. Code tit. 89, §§ 686.10, 686.30, 686.40 (2013); see also Harris, 234 S. Ct. at 2647 (Kagan,
J., dissenting) (a counselor develops a service plan and assists the customer in state-mandated performance
review, and mediates any resulting disagreements).
17
Public Act 93-204, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 313/3(n)-(o), 315/7 (2013).
18
The current CBA is available on the Illinois Department of Central Management Services website.
Collective Bargaining Agreement, Ill. Dept. of Cent. Mgmt. Servs. (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www2.illinois.gov/cms/Employees/Personnel/Documents/emp_seiupast.pdf.
16
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ability to attend a training program on state-paid time. Furthermore, the agreements
required the state to provide safety equipment (such as gloves) and created a process for
addressing safety issues, and helped assistants find jobs and customers select an assistant
by creating a registry and by requiring the state to run criminal background checks on
prospective assistants. The agreements created a grievance and arbitration system to
resolve payment issues and other contractual disputes and provided that the state and the
union would work together to address late, lost, or inaccurate paychecks. 19
Six states allow for unionization of state-paid home care workers on models like
Illinois’: California, Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, and Washington. 20
Home care workers in all of these states except Minnesota have voted to unionize and
unions have gained a variety of wage, benefit, and working condition improvements
through collective bargaining. 21 In addition, although this is an issue beyond the scope of
this paper, sixteen states have enacted laws providing for unionization of some publicly
subsidized in-home child care workers, although some of the models differ from that of
the Medicaid-paid home care workers. 22
2. Collective Bargaining and Agency Fees
Laws protecting the right to unionize and bargain collectively typically provide
that when a majority of workers choose to form a union and secure recognition of their
19

Id.; see also Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2641 (“a procedure was established to resolve grievances arising under
the collective-bargaining agreement”).
20
California enacted legislation in 1999 (AB 1682, Ch. 90, 1999), which required all counties that had not
yet done so to either establish a public authority or adopt one of the alternate methods provided in statute
for managing their home care workforce. Subsequent legislation, AB 2235 (Ch. 1135, 2002), provided that
any county that had not adopted one of the alternatives set out in AB 1682 by January 1, 2003, would be
required to become the employer of its home care workers. In Washington, Oregon, and Missouri, home
care workers won bargaining rights through voter initiatives that were later implemented by legislation, and
all three of these states provide that a government official or agency is the employer of record for purposes
of bargaining. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 410.595–625 (2014); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 7439A.095, 7439.A.30,
7439.A.220-.300, 41.56.026 (2010). Mo. Rev. Stat. § 208.856–.865 (2013). In Massachusetts, Maryland,
and Connecticut, home care workers won bargaining rights through executive order followed by
legislation: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 118E, §§70-75 (West 2006). Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. §§ 15901-07 (LexisNexis 2014), which was enacted in 2011, Md. Exec. Order 01.01.2007.15 (2007). In 2012,
the Connecticut legislature passed Public Act 12-33, codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17b-1706 et seq.
(2014). Vermont and Minnesota have brand new legislation granting bargaining rights to home care
workers but the Minnesota workers have not yet voted to unionize. Act 48 of 2013, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21,
§§ 1631-44 (2013); 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 128.
21
See SEIU Local 503, Overview of Home Care Collective Bargaining, seiu503.org, (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.seiu503.org/2013/12/overview-of-home care-collective-bargaining/.
22
The states with bargaining rights for in home child care workers are Oregon, Iowa, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and
Ohio. Minnesota enacted legislation authorizing home-based child care providers to organize, but that law
has been stayed by court order. Helen Blank et al., Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., Getting Organized:
Unionizing
Home-Based
Child
Care
Providers
(Feb.
2014),
available
at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlc_gettingorganized2013update.pdf.
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union from the employer, the union becomes the exclusive representative of the
employees for purposes of bargaining over wages and other conditions of employment,
which means that the employer cannot bargain over those topics with employees
individually or with any other union. 23 A corollary of the power conferred by the
principle of exclusive representation is that the union has the duty to represent all
employees fairly and adequately in negotiating and enforcing the contract. 24 This duty of
fair representation applies to all workers in the bargaining unit, even though employees
can choose not to join the union or to pay dues to it. 25
Unions and their members have often considered employees who do not support
the union to be a threat to their power to secure the best possible working conditions
because the power of the union comes from its ability to speak with one voice on behalf
of all workers. 26 Early in the history of labor-management relations, some unions and
employers therefore agreed to require all employees to be union members. These types of
contract terms were known as union security agreements, and they took a variety of
forms, ranging from requirements that prospective employees must be a union member at
the time of hire (closed shop), to those requiring employees to join the union shortly after
hire (union shop), to those requiring every employee simply to pay the equivalent of
union dues to cover the employee’s pro rata share of the union’s cost as exclusive
bargaining representative (agency shop). 27 From the union’s perspective, union security
agreements maximize a union’s bargaining power, and from the employer’s perspective,
limiting the labor pool to union members can ensure workers meet the union’s standards
of training and experience. (This is still the view of the medical and legal professions
today.)
Union security agreements were controversial in some cases, and so a number of
states enacted so-called “right-to-work” laws prohibiting them. Under section 14(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), these state right-to-work laws are saved from
federal preemption. 28 Labor groups challenged the constitutionality of these statutes on
the ground that they denied union workers and their employers the right to agree to the
contract terms that they preferred and denied union workers the right to associate in the
workplace only with those who shared their commitment to improved working conditions
23

See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012). See generally Martin H. Malin, et. al., Public Sector
Employment:
Cases and Materials 341–46 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing principle of exclusive
representation in public sector labor relations).
24
See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 194 (1944).
25
Id. at 202; see also id. at 204 (“So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory representative of a
craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable from the power of representation
conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft . . . [and it must] represent non-union or
minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”).
26
See generally Kenneth Dau-Schmidt et al., Labor Law in the Contemporary Workplace 1039 (2d ed.
2014) (exploring the history and development of laws governing organized labor, with strong emphasis on
dimensions of political and social power at play between employers, employees, unions, and government).
27
See id. at ch. 8.
28
29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012).
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through unionization. 29 The Court rejected these constitutional challenges, finding that
the freedom of contract arguments had been repudiated with the demise of the Lochner
era and that the union members’ freedom of association was not infringed by a statute
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of union membership. 30
Until Harris, the law with respect to union security was as follows. First, in the
private sector and in the majority of states that allow government employees to unionize,
a union is the exclusive representative of employees when a majority of employees
choose to unionize, and the union owes the duty of fair representation to all employees it
represents. 31 Second, nowhere is it legal for an employer and union to agree to either a
union shop or a closed shop. 32 Third, in the half of states without right to work
legislation, unions and employers can require employees to pay an agency fee
representing the employee’s fair share of the union’s costs germane to its role as
exclusive bargaining representative; however, employees who choose not to join the
union cannot be required to share the union’s costs for political activities not germane to
contract negotiation and administration. 33 Fourth, in the remaining states that ban any
form of union security provision (the so-called right-to-work states), the union owes a
duty of fair representation to all workers but cannot require them to pay what members
pay to cover its costs. 34
Harris made Illinois a right-to-work state for its home care workers only; private
sector and government employers can continue to negotiate agency fee provisions for all
other workers in the state. Therefore, while Illinois is not a right-to-work state, it now
encompasses a right-to-work regime that only applies to certain home care workers paid
with Medicaid funds.
3. The Background of Harris v. Quinn
Harris v. Quinn is the product of a litigation and legislative campaign of National
Right to Work (NRTW), a corporate-funded organization that seeks to dismantle unions
29

Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 529 (1949). See infra text
accompanying notes 111.
30
Id.at 537.
31
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RR Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202–03; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,,186
(1967).
32
NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743–45 (1963).
33
See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988); Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
34
Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 756–57 (1963). One of us has
argued elsewhere that section 14(b) should be read to preempt state right to work laws to the extent that
they prohibit contract provisions requiring employees to pay less than the full amount of union dues and,
alternatively, that in any state where employees are permitted to avoid paying anything to unions, federal
law should either allow unions to represent only those who choose to become union members and pay dues
or should allow unions to charge nonpaying nonmembers if they wish the union to represent them in
disciplinary matters. Catherine Fisk & Benjamin Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right-to Work Law, 4 U.C.
Irv. L. Rev. 857 (2014).
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and the regulatory regime built on worker collective action. The organization’s particular
focus in sixty years of federal and state litigation and legislative efforts has been union
security agreements. NRTW has been the driving force behind efforts to prohibit union
security agreements by legislation or ballot initiative. And it has litigated every major
case on this topic at the Supreme Court including most of the cases discussed here.
The NRTW theory has changed little over sixty years. In its view, employment
agreements requiring workers to join a union, to finance any of its operations, or even
that allow the union to negotiate on behalf of employees, violate the First Amendment
rights of employees. In the first Supreme Court case on this, Railway Employees
Department v. Hanson in 1956, NRTW argued that the Railway Labor Act, which allows
railways and airlines to negotiate union security provisions with unions, violated the First
Amendment because it allows the contracts to compel employees to support unions.35
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the contractual requirement that
employees pay for the services that the union was required to provide was not compelled
speech. 36 But five years later, in International Association of Machinists v. Street, the
Court suggested that railroad collective bargaining agreements that require payment of
union dues or fees do raise issues of compelled speech prohibited by the First
Amendment to the extent that the union spends the money to support political causes
including candidates for public office and political programs. 37 The Court avoided the
First Amendment issue by reading the Railway Labor Act not to authorize union security
provisions that require employees to pay fees to support political activity. 38
Three aspects of Hanson and Street are noteworthy because the Court in Harris
disregarded them. First, the Court in Street emphasized that Congress in enacting the
RLA had chosen to rely on private entities—railroads, airlines, and the unions
35

Brief for the National Right to Work Committee as Amicus Curiae, Railway Employees Department v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (No.451), 1956 WL 88890.
36
Because the payments were required by a contract between private entities (a railroad and a union), there
was no state action and the First Amendment would ordinarily not apply. The Court found state action in
the Railway Labor Act preempting Nebraska law that prohibited such provisions. Justice Douglas
explained:
If private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement made pursuant to federal
law which expressly declares that state law is superseded. In other words, the federal
statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost or
sacrificed.4 The enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the
governmental action on which the Constitution operates, though it takes a private
agreement to invoke the federal sanction.
Ry. Emps. Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (internal citations omitted). This is a variation of the
state action analysis the Court adopted in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948), holding that
government enforcement of a private contract is state action. The Court has never extended Shelley beyond
restrictive covenants, for to do so would turn all private contracts into state action. And it has never
extended beyond Street the principle that preemption of state law invalidating a contract makes the contract
term state action. If this position were accepted today, it would raise a constitutional issue in every
employment, consumer and other agreement containing provisions that are valid only because a federal law
preempts state law, which is the case for virtually all arbitration agreements.
37
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768–69 (1961).
38
Id. at 764.
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representing employees in those industries—to develop and administer rules and
processes to ensure that employees were properly trained, that working conditions in
these dangerous and difficult jobs were safe, that wages and benefits were sufficient to
attract and retain a talented workforce, and that issues about working conditions were
resolved peacefully among the transportation company managers and employees who
were in the best position to resolve them. 39 This regulatory framework, Congress and the
Court realized, “entails the expenditure of considerable funds.” 40 Whereas the companies
could recoup their share of the costs through increased fares, unions had to rely on
member dues. As the Court explained, “because of the expense of performing their duties
in the congressional scheme, fairness justified the spreading of the costs to all employees
who benefited. They [the unions] advanced as their purpose the elimination of the ‘free
riders’—those employees who obtained the benefits of the unions’ participation in the
machinery of the Act without financially supporting the unions.” 41
Second, the Court did not accept the argument that contracts requiring employees
to pay their fair share of the costs of maintaining the regulatory system constituted
compelled speech or compelled association when the union used the money to perform
the services it is statutorily required to provide to all employees. On the contrary, the
Court recognized the Railway Labor Act allowed contracts to require “employees to
share the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the costs of
the adjustment and settlement of disputes” because “fairness justified the spreading of the
costs to all employees who benefited.” 42
Third, while the Court read the RLA to prohibit rail unions from using money
exacted from dissenting employees “to support political causes which they oppose,” 43 it
also recognized that legislation restricting the union from using its funds “for the purpose
of disseminating information as to candidates and programs and publicizing the positions
of the unions on them . . . would work a restraint on the expression of political ideas
which might be offensive to the First Amendment.” 44 Thus, the Court recognized that
unions did not simply possess statutory rights but also possessed constitutional rights
under the First Amendment and, moreover, that these rights were inextricably connected
to the ability of unions to fund their political activities.
The Court extended the regime it invented in Street to government workers in
1977 in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. 45 Abood arose from a Michigan public
sector labor relations statute that allowed school districts to agree to agency shop
provisions and allowed unions to spend agency fees on political activities. The Court held
that Michigan could not constitutionally allow expenditure of agency fees on political
39

Id. at 758–59.
Id. at 760.
41
Id. at 761.
42
Id. at 761, 763–64.
43
Id. at 764.
44
Id. at 773.
45
431 U.S. 209 (1977).
40

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss10/74
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1526

10

Fisk and Poueymirou: Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech

activities over the objection of nonunion teachers, but that the union was entitled to
collect and expend agency fees for purposes germane to its role as bargaining
representative. Justice Powell’s opinion for a unanimous Court explained why unions
must be able to charge fees for the services they are legally required to provide workers:
The designation of a union as exclusive representative carries with it great
responsibilities. The tasks of negotiating and administering a collectivebargaining agreement and representing the interests of employees in
settling disputes and processing grievances are continuing and difficult
ones. They often entail expenditure of much time and money. The services
of lawyers, expert negotiators, economists, and a research staff, as well as
general administrative personnel, may be required. Moreover, in carrying
out these duties, the union is obliged fairly and equitably to represent all
employees, union and nonunion, within the relevant unit. A union-shop
arrangement has been thought to distribute fairly the cost of these
activities among those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive that
employees might otherwise have to become “free riders” to refuse to
contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation
that necessarily accrue to all employees. 46
Abood was the first case to hold that government employees have a First Amendment
right to refuse to pay for union political activities, but it was also unanimous in holding
that employees can be required to share the costs of union representational services.
Thus, what Abood confirmed—and what later cases reiterated—was that membership
dues potentially implicated the First Amendment but that this depended upon the types of
activities for which the dues were used. Dues spent on collective bargaining and germane
activities were constitutional because the government had a compelling interest in
spreading the costs to cover these services. However, to compel an employee to subsidize
a union’s political activities offended the First Amendment.
After Abood, the Court decided a series of cases distinguishing between costs that
are chargeable to dissenters and those that are not. Many of the cases sparked dissent, as
Justices disagreed with one another about whether certain union expenses benefitted all
members of the bargaining unit and should be paid for by all or whether they
impermissibly allowed the union to spend money on political or ideological causes that
dissenters opposed. One such case, Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 47 is noteworthy
for the recognition by the entire Court, including Justices who joined the majority opinion
in Harris, of the reasons why statutes allow unions to charge dissenters for the cost of
activities germane to its role as bargaining agent. As Justice Scalia explained in his
concurring and dissenting opinion:

46
47

Id. at 221–22.
500 U.S. 507 (1991).
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Our First Amendment jurisprudence . . . recognizes a correlation between
the rights and the duties of the union, on the one hand, and the nonunion
members of the bargaining unit, on the other. Where the state imposes
upon the union a duty to deliver services, it may permit the union to
demand reimbursement for them; or, looked at from the other end, where
the state creates in the nonmembers a legal entitlement from the union, it
may compel them to pay the cost. The “compelling state interest” that
justifies this constitutional rule is not simply elimination of the inequity
arising from the fact that some union activity redounds to the benefit of
“free-riding” nonmembers; private speech often furthers the interests of
nonspeakers, and that does not alone empower the state to compel the
speech to be paid for. What is distinctive, however, about the “free riders”
who are nonunion members of the union's own bargaining unit is that in
some respects they are free riders whom the law requires the union to
carry-indeed, requires the union to go out of its way to benefit, even at the
expense of its other interests. In the context of bargaining, a union must
seek to further the interests of its nonmembers; it cannot, for example,
negotiate particularly high wage increases for its members in exchange for
accepting no increases for others. Thus, the free ridership (if it were left to
be that) would be not incidental but calculated, not imposed by
circumstances but mandated by government decree. 48
Justice Scalia’s observation that it is the duty of fair representation imposed by law that
creates the free rider problem disappeared entirely in Harris.
B.

Harris v. Quinn

Harris v. Quinn was brought by NRTW on behalf of a putative class of home care
workers who did not wish to be represented by a union. In the district court, NRTW
characterized the workers as recipients of government benefits and the services the union
provided to them as being lobbying for expenditure of government funds. 49 The district
court dismissed the suit, reasoning that the assistants were state employees, the fees were
charged for collective bargaining not lobbying, and under Abood and Lehnert, the Illinois
law was constitutional. 50 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the case to be controlled
by Abood. 51

48

Id. at 556.
Harris v. Quinn, No. 10—cv—02477, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 4376500, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2010). As
the district court explained, “Plaintiffs do not deny that fair share fees in the collective bargaining context
have been found constitutional. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the exclusive representation arrangement here
is ‘nothing short of compulsory political representation’ that violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights by
compelling them to support a state-designated entity for purposes of lobbying the State for additional
benefits from a government program.” Id. at *6.
50
Id. at *6–9.
51
Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2011).
49
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In the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs expanded their argument from distinguishing
the Court’s fair share fee jurisprudence to attacking it. While they persisted in arguing
that home care workers are not government employees and that union representation is
akin to lobbying over expenditure of government funds, they asked the Court not only to
strike down the Illinois law but also to overrule Abood and make it unconstitutional for
any public sector employer to agree to an agency fee provision. 52
The Court did not go that far. Although a substantial portion of Justice Alito’s
opinion for the five-Justice majority was devoted to criticizing Abood, the majority in the
end limited its holding to home care workers paid by the state yet selected and supervised
by private individuals. 53 Harris thus leaves undisturbed all state public sector labor laws
except those governing workers with arrangements like the home care law in Illinois.
The holding and reasoning are composed of five major propositions.
First, to make the case for a First Amendment right to refuse to pay agency fees,
the Court began by criticizing Hanson, Street, and Abood for rejecting the First
Amendment as a limit on agency fees. To do so, the majority faulted these cases’ First
Amendment analysis and, especially, their reliance on the analogy between agency fee
provisions and state laws requiring lawyers to join and pay dues to the state bar.
Acknowledging that in Lathrop v. Donohue the Court rejected a First Amendment
challenge to the integrated bar, Justice Alito quoted at length from Justice
Douglas’s Lathrop dissent in which he complained that requiring lawyers to join the bar
gives “carte blanche to any legislature to put . . . professional people into goose-stepping
brigades.” 54
Second, the Harris majority criticized the notion that dissenters’ First Amendment
rights are sufficiently protected by being able to resist paying for political activities.
Here, Justice Alito’s opinion emphasized that in the public sector, everything a union
does is political.55 Public sector collective bargaining over wages, pensions and benefits,
the majority maintained, “are important political issues;” 56 “both collective bargaining
and political advocacy and lobbying are directed at the government” 57 and the line
between these activities, for which employees must pay, and political activities is difficult
to draw. 58 Therefore, the division between chargeable and nonchargeable expenses is

52

Brief for Petitioner at 1–2 , Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (No. 11-681), 2014 WL 131659, at
*2 (“The time has come to overrule Abood.”).
53
Harris split along the ideological line that has become familiar. The five Justices appointed by
Republican presidents (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy) ruled the
Illinois law unconstitutional; the four appointed by Democrats (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and
Kagan) dissented.
54
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2629 (quoting 367 U.S. 820, 885 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
55
Id. at 2632.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 2632–33.
58
Id. at 2633.
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illusory because one cannot distinguish between “nonpolitical” and “political” union
activities and expenditures.
Third, although the majority criticized Abood, apparently there were not enough
votes to overrule it. So the majority held only that home care workers paid by Medicaid,
whom the majority variously termed “partial-public employees,” “quasi-public
employees,” or “not full-fledged public employees,” 59 have a First Amendment right to
refuse to pay agency fees. Justice Alito emphasized all the ways in which these workers
were not like other government employees: they are selected by the recipient of care, not
by the government; the recipient of care approves— along with the state agency, though
the majority does not mention this—the service plan defining the job duties; and the state
and the recipient of care jointly control the annual review of the care provider’s job
performance. Additionally, Illinois’ home care workers do not participate in the state
employees’ retirement and health benefit plans but in the union’s plans with funding
contributed by the state, and they are ineligible to participate in other state employee
programs, including those covering job sharing, banking and sharing sick leave and
vacation time, and behavioral health programs. 60 Finally, the government disclaims tort
liability for the acts of home care workers and therefore excludes them from the
protections of the indemnification law. 61
Under Illinois law, however, home care workers are public employees. And as
Justice Kagan pointed out in dissent, home care workers in programs structured like
Illinois’ are treated by the United States Department of Labor as joint employees of the
state and the care recipient. 62 They are paid entirely through government funds and the
state regulates a number of aspects of eligibility for, and conditions of employment as, a
home care worker. In rejecting Illinois’ determination that home care workers are state
employees as a matter of state law, then, the Court ignored its usual rule that it does not
decide state law questions. Other than home care workers in Illinois, moreover, it is not
clear which workers fall into this new category of workers exempt from Abood, which
makes this one of the most puzzling parts of the Court’s opinion.
There are two additional puzzling aspects of this step in the Court’s reasoning.
First, what is the line between full-fledged government employees (who do not have First
Amendment rights to resist agency fee provisions) and “quasi-public employees” who
have the Harris right? The majority never explained why the coverage of these myriad
Illinois laws is relevant to the question whether different types of state employees should
have different First Amendment rights. Whether they can participate in the state jobsharing program, or whether they get health care from a program funded by the state but
administered by SEIU as opposed to one funded by the state and administered by the
state’s chosen plan administrator has nothing to do with whether employees should have
59

Id.
Id. at 2634–35.
61
Id. at 2635.
62
Id. at 2646 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting); 78 Fed. Reg. 60483-60484 (2013).
60
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a First Amendment right to resist paying fair share fees. And it is ironic that the Court
granted greater First Amendment rights to a category of government workers who are
less than full-fledged, while simultaneously attacking collective bargaining by them as
being more political than the bargaining approved in Abood.
At a more practical level, the absence of any logical connection between the
reasons the majority gives for finding home care workers not to be state employees
makes it difficult for states to respond to the decision. How many of the programs
identified by the majority would Illinois have to extend to home care workers in order to
bring them back into the usual rule for agency fee agreements? The uncertain
implications of this decision are further illuminated by focusing on state employees other
than home care workers. If some state employees are excluded from, say, the State
Employee Vacation Time Act or the State Employee Health Savings Account Law, but
are covered by the State Employee Job Sharing Act and by the State Employee
Indemnification Act, do they have the enhanced First Amendment rights of home care
workers or the same First Amendment rights as state troopers, park rangers, or DMV
clerks? Because the majority never explained why the coverage of these Illinois laws is
relevant to the issue in the case, it provided no basis for Illinois lawyers and legislators to
figure out how to respond, nor any basis for determining what other states’ labor relations
laws might be vulnerable to a Harris-type challenge.
The fourth major conceptual step in the Harris majority opinion is an empirical
claim: in Justice Alito’s view, agency fee contracts are not necessary for public sector
collective bargaining to work, at least in relation to this category of workers. 63 In the
majority’s view, collective bargaining supported by agency fees is unnecessary because
state law limits the scope of bargaining to the terms within the State’s control, and many
conditions of employment are set by the recipient of services, not the state. 64
Additionally, the union is not responsible for handling very many grievances because the
statutorily required grievance procedure “appears to relate solely to any grievance that a
personal assistant may have with the State.” 65
This is the heart of the Court’s response to the free rider argument in Harris: the
subjects of bargaining and the grievance procedure are limited, so the union’s obligations
to nonpayers are also limited, so collective bargaining isn’t truly necessary to protect
workers, so unions do not need to collect fees from dissenters in order to achieve
whatever benefits unionization provides. The majority opinion phrased this point in terms
of a burden of proof that the union had not sustained: an agency fee provision “cannot be
sustained unless the cited benefits for personal assistants could not have been achieved if
the union had been required to depend for funding on the dues paid by those personal
assistants who chose to join. No such showing has been made.” 66Although Justice Alito
63

Harris,134 S. Ct. at 2636.
Id. at 2636.
65
Id. at 2637.
66
Id. at 2641.
64
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noted various improvements in wages, working conditions, and training attained through
unionization, he speculated that unions need not collect fees from nonmembers to achieve
these benefits because members’ dues were sufficient. Justice Alito also speculated that
unions need be no different from organizations that depend on voluntary contributions to
advocate on behalf of occupational groups. 67 This aspect of the opinion is in tension with
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lehnert, which argued that the free-rider problem is more
acute for unions than for other organizations, because only unions have a legal duty of
fair representation to all employees. 68
Whether agency fee provisions are necessary to an effective labor relations
regime is, as Justice Alito explained, fundamentally an empirical issue. 69 Justice Kagan’s
dissent disputed the majority’s speculation about the empirics, including the nature and
extent of the union’s burdens in providing services to nonpaying workers. Union
advocates, for example, point to the fact that union density and wages are lower in rightto-work states than in states in which unions can charge agency fees. Scholars have
attributed the difference in union density between Canada and the United States, and
especially the sharper decline in union density in the U.S. as compared to Canada, to
right-to-work laws. 70 Reasonable minds have been differing for a century on the question
of whether collective bargaining improves productivity, wages or working conditions,
and whether some form of agency fee provision is necessary to make the entire
architecture of labor relations run.
Advocates of judicial restraint would argue that the majority was wrong to
arrogate to itself the responsibility for deciding what kinds of contract provisions are
necessary for state agencies to effectively manage the state labor force and for the
majority’s unsupported empirical claims that free riding is not a major problem and that
unions do not need agency fees in order to effectively represent home care workers.
Advocates of an activist and pragmatic federal judiciary would perhaps find nothing
amiss in the Court determining whether particular regulatory regimes are necessary or
desirable, although they might want more engagement with the empirical studies on
whether agency fees are necessary to enable unions to operate effectively. And of course
disputants over federalism might line up over this one too. One side might complain that
the Court gave too little respect to the Illinois government’s judgments about how to
manage its own workforce; the other might celebrate the Court’s protection of the First
Amendment rights of state workers. But what is amusing about Harris is that it is the
Republican-appointed Justices who are both activist and anti-state’s rights here,
substituting their policy views about the importance of certain labor contract terms for
67

Id.
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991).
69
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2634.
70
Daphne Gottlieb Taras & Allen Ponak, Mandatory Agency Shop Laws as an Explanation of Canada-U.S.
Union Density Divergence, 22 J. Lab. Res. 541 (2001) (finding that mandatory agency shop laws in
Canada and spread of right to work laws in U.S. may explain why U.S. union density, which was similar to
Canada until 1960s, fell more sharply than in Canada).
68
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those of the Illinois legislature and governor about a matter of state governance. The
majority in Harris departed from the view that has prevailed since 1937, when the Court
abandoned substantive due process jurisprudence and upheld the NLRA against exactly
the kind of challenges as were made in this case—that it limited the freedom of nonunion
workers and was unnecessary to protect labor relations. 71 The doctrinal difference is that
then it was the Due Process Clause that was the basis for invalidating labor legislation;
here it is the First Amendment.
The final step in the majority’s analysis was its effort to distinguish the speech
rights of home care workers from those of government employees generally.
Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, government employees have no First Amendment protection
for their speech on the job and in the scope of employment. 72 Ironically, therefore,
government employees have a robust First Amendment right to refuse to pay agency fees
while they have no First Amendment right to engage in other on-the-job speech.
Under Pickering v. Board of Education, government employees have a right to comment
off the job “as a citizen” on matters of public concern only when this right is not
outweighed by “the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.” 73 The Harris majority did not
discuss Garcetti, only mentioning the case in a footnote. 74 Pickering did not apply to
home care workers, the majority claimed, because “the State [i]s not acting in a
traditional employer role.” 75 If Pickering did apply, the Court asserted that the home care
workers’ First Amendment rights outweighed the government’s interests. 76
III.

Agency Fees Are Not Compelled Speech
A. The Flaws in the Compelled Speech Analysis of Agency Fees

The five steps in the majority’s reasoning outlined above rest on a fundamental
flaw: the Court sees a First Amendment violation where there should be none.
Contractually required fees for union representational services are not speech. Payment
71

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
73
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Garcetti involved a deputy district attorney who was
disciplined for writing a memo to his supervisor complaining about the office’s handling of evidence and
police testimony. Pickering involved a teacher who wrote a letter to the local newspaper critiquing the way
in which the school board had handled raising revenue for the district’s schools. The United States and
Justice Kagan’s dissent both argued that bargaining over terms and conditions of employment is
unprotected under Garcetti because it concerns working conditions. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2653–54 (Kagan,
J., dissenting). If the Deputy District Attorney in Garcetti had no First Amendment protection against
discipline for writing a memo to his supervisor, so, too, employees should have no heightened First
Amendment protection for refusing to pay fees to a union to bargain on their behalf on all of those topics.
74
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2642.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 2643.
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of fees for services is just that: purchasing a service. 77 It is a form of conduct, like giving
someone a twenty-dollar bill. Writing a check or authorizing a credit card transaction or
payroll deduction for the same twenty-dollar bill involves speech (writing, or typing, or
clicking a box), but the operative part of the transaction is conduct—transfer of funds—
not speech. This action has no more expressive content than does compulsory payment of
library fines, taxes, homeowners’ association dues, or insurance premiums—all of which
the recipient will use to fund a variety of speech and other activities.
There are, of course, circumstances when giving someone money is expressive
because the donor intends it as an endorsement of someone’s views and gives money in
order for those views to be propagated widely, as when one contributes to a political
campaign or to an organization like the ACLU or the NRA. But when the payment is
compulsory, it loses its expressive aspect. If a political candidate extorts money from
someone, the payment sends no message of endorsement or the desire to support speech.
When a pacifist and death penalty opponent pays her taxes knowing some part of them
will be used by generals to promote war and by prosecutors to advocate the death penalty,
she does not endorse war or the death penalty. And when a lawyer pays her state bar
dues, she conveys no message one way or the other about the content or enforcement of
the state bar ethics rules or its administration of the admission and discipline system.
Even though compulsory payments are not themselves expressive conduct, they
might still raise First Amendment issues because they compel a person to subsidize
another’s speech. Whether compulsory financial support for another’s expressive activity
violates the First Amendment is a difficult issue because it involves the unwilling donor’s
speech rights, the recipient’s own free speech rights, and the viability of regulatory
regimes that have nothing to do with speech. 78 Living in a community requires financial
support of organizations that may spend money on speech activities as well as other
services that have little or nothing to do with expressive conduct. Many live in
neighborhoods or condominium complexes and are compelled to pay homeowners’
association dues that are spent on speech activities as well as on non-expressive activities
like landscaping. We all pay taxes that support, among other things, libraries, schools,
and other programs that engage in speech activities we may abhor. The community
77

As Robert Post pointed out in an article criticizing the incoherence in the Court’s cases on compelled
subsidies for speech, if any compelled requirement to pay for services involving speech raises a First
Amendment issue, then the First Amendment is implicated by statutes requiring litigants to pay their
opponents’ attorneys’ fees, permitting registration of automobiles only if mechanics have certified they
meet emissions standards, allowing children to enroll in public school only if physicians certify they have
been immunized against diseases, or requiring publicly owned corporations to pay for financial reports of
independent accountants. Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Association, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 195, 211-212. See also Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 939, 942-43
(discussing the compelled speech issues raised by a South Dakota statute requiring physicians performing
abortions to first inform the patient that she is terminating the life of “a whole, separate, unique, living
human being” and that abortion may cause a significant risk of psychological trauma).
78
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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typically has a much greater interest in requiring financial support of organizations that
provide collective goods than it does in forcing anybody to speak.
In a long series of cases, the Supreme Court has struggled to articulate rules
governing which uses of compelled financial contributions or property violate the First
Amendment rights of unwilling donors or property owners and when the rights of the
collective to speak outweigh the rights of the individual to object. 79 The Court has
sometimes upheld mandatory fees finding that they do not involve any compelled speech.
It upheld student activity fees at public universities in Board of Regents of the University
of Wisconsin System v. Southworth. 80 The Court held that such a fee was constitutional,
even when some funds were spent on political speech, so long as the university
distributed the funds in a viewpoint-neutral manner. 81 In Keller v. State Bar of California,
the Court said that the Bar could use compulsory dues only if the dues were “reasonably
incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession, including operating the
disciplinary system, or ‘improving the quality of the legal service available to the people
of the State.”’ 82 In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, the Court upheld federal
regulations that required fruit producers to contribute funds to pay for generic advertising
for fruit. 83 In all of these cases, the compelled subsidy was for speech as well as other
services and activities. And, as the Court remarked in Glickman, in none of them did the
assessments “engender any crisis of conscience.” 84
In cases that the Court found a compulsory payment to violate the First
Amendment, the Court found the subsidy for speech to be unrelated to other regulatory or
community goals or to present a risk that the audience might erroneously attribute the
message to the unwilling donor. United States v. United Foods, Inc., decided four years
after Glickman, 85 invalidated mandatory assessments for generic product advertising of
mushrooms, finding the compelled subsidy to be separable from the regulation of
mushrooms. 86 Other cases found compelled speech where the government required
someone to make his or her property or resources available to a speaker when there was a
risk that the audience would attribute the speaker’s message to the unwilling donor. Thus,
in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, the Court invalidated a state law that
required newspapers to provide space to political candidates who had been verbally
79

See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v.
Seiu, Local 1000, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1023 (2013).
80
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
81
Id. at 233–34.
82
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).
83
Glickman v. Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
84
Id. at 472.
85
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 408 (2001).
86
Id. Justice Kennedy distinguished Glickman on the ground that “the mandated assessments for speech
were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy” and California tree fruit
producers were constrained in other aspects of their marketing, but no similar restrictions applied to
mushroom producers who were not bound by the statute to “associate as a group which makes cooperative
decisions.” Id. at 411, 413.
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attacked in print. 87 And in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California, the Court invalidated a regulation that required a private utility company to
include in its billing envelopes materials prepared by a public interest group. 88
But where there is little risk that people will erroneously attribute the message to
the entity required to allow the speaker to use its property, the Court has rejected the
compelled speech argument. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic Institutional Rights,
Inc., the Court held that the Solomon Amendment, which required universities receiving
federal funds to open their premises to military recruiters, did not involve compelled
speech because it “neither limits what law schools may say nor requires them to say
anything” but leaves them “free . . . to express whatever views they may have on the
military’s congressionally mandated employment policy, all the while retaining eligibility
for federal funds.” 89 Similarly, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Court held
that a state constitution requiring shopping center owners to allow protesters to speak on
their premises did not compel speech: “The views expressed by members of the public in
passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be
identified with those of the owner.” 90 Moreover, the Court said that “no specific message
is dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants’ property . . . . [A]ppellants can
expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area
where the speakers or handbillers stand.” 91
In most of the cases addressing when mandatory payments constitute compelled
speech, the Court has explored the extent to which the payments are part of a larger
system for regulating conduct. As we noted above, in United Foods, for example, Justice
Kennedy emphasized that the mandatory assessments upheld in Glickman to promote
fruits “were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy”
and that the regime bound growers into “a group which makes cooperative decisions,”
but that the mushroom assessments were not. 92 Similarly, in Southworth, the Court
emphasized the diversity of uses to which student activity fees were put in the context of
the intellectual environment a university seeks to create. 93 And, of course, Street
and Abood emphasized that agency fee requirements facilitated a comprehensive statute
creating self-governance in labor relations.
B. The Communitarian Argument for Compelled Fees

87

Miami Herald Publ’g. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–58 (1974).
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986).
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Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006).
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PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
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Communitarian activities always involve a balance of the rights of the community
and the rights of the individual. A community organization requires financial support, and
usually some of the money it receives will be spent on speech activities. The Supreme
Court has long recognized that the community typically has a much greater interest in
requiring financial support of organizations that provide collective goods than it does in
forcing anybody to speak. This underlies the distinction the Court has drawn between
government speech and private speech: when the government speaks (as the community
does when it funds libraries) or when the government funds private entities to speak (as it
does when it funds legal services organizations or health care programs), the Court has
held that its choice of message does not violate the First Amendment rights of those who
fund the speech or those private entities that receive funds for purpose of speech. 94 In yet
another agricultural advertising case, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, the
Court upheld a requirement that cattle producers pay a fee that was used by the Beef
Board, a group of beef producers appointed pursuant to a federal law, to promote the sale
of beef. 95 Justice Scalia rejected the First Amendment challenge brought by dissenting
beef producers, finding the subsidy to be analogous to taxes that fund government speech
and emphasizing the importance of allowing the government to speak. 96
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Johanns, as well as the scholarly
commentary, noted that the majority had not satisfactorily explained how the mushroom
advertising regime struck down as compelled speech in United Foods differed from the
beef advertising found to be government speech in Johanns. 97 The more significant
problem for the Court’s analysis was not identified in that case: how does a statute and
regulations appointing a private organization to speak in general terms about beef differ
from a statute and regulations appointing a private organization (a union) to speak in
general terms about wages, hours, and other conditions of employment in a bargaining
unit? If government involvement in appointment of the organization, a law compelling
financial contribution, and general statutory guidelines about the topics of speech make
the advertising in Johanns government speech, it would seem that government
certification of a union as the exclusive bargaining representative and regulation of the
subjects of bargaining would make bargaining government speech in the public sector.

94

See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) (stating that where private speech is
involved, even Congress’ antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought
inimical to the Government's own interest); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (stating that the
Government does not violate the Constitution when it selectively funds a program to encourage certain
activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program
which seeks to deal with the problem in another way).
95
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 56465 (2005).
96
Id. at 561 (quoting 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901(b), 2902(13) and 7 C.F.R. § 1260.169(d) (2004)).
97
Robert Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 S.
Ct. Rev. 195, 197 (arguing that the fundamental premise of the Court’s compelled subsidization of speech
doctrine is flawed and it is “simply not true that First Amendment concerns are implicated whenever
persons are required to subsidize speech with which they disagree”).
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The significance of Johanns for us is not that collective bargaining is government
speech, but rather that the Court recognized in Johanns that communities routinely rely
on compelled financial support of private organizations to achieve regulatory goals and
that the Court in some cases recognizes the importance of allowing the community to do
so. In Harris, the state of Illinois chose to rely on a partnership between the state agency
and the union to develop standards and processes to ensure quality service in the
government-funded home care sector, believing it would improve the lives of both
patients and care providers. The state could fund the union’s operations directly through
tax revenue, which would raise no First Amendment issue, or it could empower the union
to fund it through compulsory fees. Either way, compulsory payments fund a regulatory
regime which involves expressive activities. In Johanns, the Court acknowledged the
government’s own interests in achieving its regulatory goal – the promotion of beef
production and consumption. This is the same point the Court emphasized in Street.98
Congress chose to regulate labor relations by relying on private entities (in that case
railroads and the unions representing employees) to develop and administer a regulatory
regime ensuring safe and efficient transportation with minimal service interruptions and
with adequate working conditions. As noted above, the Court recognized this regulatory
framework imposed considerable expense on the private organizations and it allowed the
unions to charge workers for the cost of running it, just as the Beef Board can charge
producers for the cost of maintaining that regulatory regime. 99 Similarly, in Harris
Illinois chose to rely on the union to administer certain aspects of the regulatory regime
governing home care workers and the health insurance plan for them. 100
The Court’s elemental mistake in its compelled speech jurisprudence was to
extend the rule from cases where the government actually was trying to compel speech—
as in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, which invalidated a compulsory flag
salute law 101—to cases involving the requirement to pay money. As shown above, the
cases involving compelled financial support are difficult to reconcile, but laws that
include financial support as an integral part of a regulatory regime much broader than
promoting speech tend to be upheld.
One final aspect of compelled expenditures requires attention: even if compelled
financial support does not violate the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, does the
mere fact of giving money to an organization make the donor complicit in the
organization’s activities and, if so, does the complicity give the dissenter a First
Amendment right to opt out? The Court has generally (but not consistently) held that
compelled payments to an organization that acts in ways one opposes does not violate the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and until the summer of 2014 when the
Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, it had also rejected arguments that compelled
98

Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560-61; Street, 367 U.S. at 760-61.
Street, 367 U.S. at 760.
100
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2624-25.
101
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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financial support violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 102 However,
in Hobby Lobby, the Court held that compelled financial contributions may substantially
burden religious exercise if the recipient uses some part of the money to fund other
people to engage in conduct that the donor finds religiously objectionable.
That case considered the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s
requirement that employers fund health insurance benefits and whether this provision
violated the free exercise rights of owners of a corporation when they insisted that paying
money to a health insurance plan contravened their religious beliefs if the plan covered
contraceptive methods the owners thought would destroy human embryos. 103 In earlier
cases, the Court rejected the argument that compelled payments substantially burden
religious exercise, thus, for example, rejecting a claim by Amish businessmen that paying
Social Security taxes violated their religion. 104 In Hobby Lobby, the Court distinguished
two cases in which taxpayers objected to government subsidies to religious organizations,
pointing out that in both cases the financial support was not alleged to violate the
taxpayers’ religious beliefs, only their beliefs about proper church-state relations. 105 It
would take another article to sort out the difference between the complicity argument that
prevailed in Hobby Lobby and those in the compelled speech cases and in the other cases
in which the Court has rejected the contention that compelled financial support makes
one complicit in another’s conduct that the individual finds morally repugnant. For
present purposes it is sufficient to note that the Court has never accepted the notion that
financial support always or even usually equals complicity sufficient to establish a free
speech violation.
Moreover, as we argue in Part IV, even if the majority is right and paying fees is a
form of compelled speech, then the majority’s requirement that union members pay fees
that the union must use for contract negotiation and administration for their free-riding
co-workers is equally compelled speech of the union and its members. As we explain
below, on the Court’s analysis, unions and their members’ First Amendment rights are
implicated when laws require unions to provide services to nonpaying nonmembers.
IV.

When It’s Not “Other People’s Money”: The First Amendment Rights of
Unions and Union Members

The heart of the argument that unions violate employees’ rights when they spend
fees and dues on expressive activity is that the unions are spending the employees’
102

There is a vast literature on compelled financial support and claims of freedom of conscience and
speech, and a number of the arguments we present here are essayed in different contexts at greater length
there. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech and Money, 97 Va. L. Rev. 317, 372–82 (2011)
(exploring the contentions that money isn’t conscience, association, or speech).
103
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778–79 (2014).
104
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
105
Id. at 2779, citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971), and Board of Ed. of Central School
Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968).
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money rather than the union’s. This is fundamentally false. Like insurance companies,
homeowners’ associations, and other organizations, unions pool money contributed by
many stakeholders and spend it to provide services and to engage in expressive activity.
When they do so, they advance the interests of the entity and its stakeholders who support
the action, and, sometimes, they thwart the interests of stakeholders who oppose it. But a
full First Amendment analysis of the issues must consider the interests of the entity and
its members as well as those who contribute to the union but oppose the action in
question.
Harris and the fee-objector cases that preceded it consider only one set of First
Amendment interests: the speech and associational rights of dissenters who object to
paying dues or special assessment fees that might subsidize a union’s political activities.
The Court has not examined the competing First Amendment interests of unions and
union members to engage in these political activities. The Court’s expansion of First
Amendment protection for corporate speech and rights of “expressive association” for
other groups necessitates a re-assessment of the speech rights of unions in the context of
fee objections.
The Court has assessed the constitutionality of agency-fee agreements in relation
to the First Amendment rights of dissenters on the one hand, and Congress’ interest in
combatting free riders and promoting labor peace through its adoption of federal labor
statutes on the other. 106 But this skews the balance of rights because it considers only one
side – the objectors – to have First Amendment rights while portraying the other side as
having only a statutory interest in avoiding free riding. 107 As we explain below, unions
enjoy First Amendment protection as expressive associations. Moreover, to the extent
that union membership dues constitute speech, union members also possess strong First
Amendment claims in relation to their dues being used to subsidize free riders. If the First
Amendment is going to be deployed as a limit on union speech it must also be considered
in defense of union speech. The ability of unions to raise and spend money to advance

106

See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2643 (“Agency-fee provisions unquestionably impose a heavy burden on the
First Amendment interests of objecting employees. And on the other side of the balance, the arguments on
which the United States relies – relating to the promotion of labor peace and the problem of free riders –
have already been discussed.”) (internal citations omitted).
107
Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Knox proves illustrative here. Rebuking the Ninth Circuit for
suggesting that the Supreme Court had “call[ed] for a balancing of the ‘right’ of the union to collect an
agency fee against the First Amendment rights of nonmembers” Justice Alito reiterated the point first raised
in Davenport that “unions have no constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees.” Knox
v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2291 (2012). (internal citations omitted).
He then stated that “[a] union's “collection of fees from nonmembers is authorized by an act of legislative
grace,”—one that we have termed “unusual” and “extraordinary.” Far from calling for a balancing of rights
or interests . . . exacting fees from unwilling contributors must be ‘carefully tailored to minimize the
infringement’ of free speech rights. And to underscore the meaning of this careful tailoring . . . [the]
measures burdening the freedom of speech or association must serve a “compelling interest” and must not
be significantly broader than necessary to serve that interest.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
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the interests of workers is core First Amendment activity. 108 When the Court interprets
the duty of fair representation to require unions to expend money to promote the working
conditions of those who have a right to refuse to pay, it impinges upon the union’s First
Amendment rights and does so in a way that is not sufficiently narrowly tailored.
A. The First Amendment Rights of Unions: Recognized and then Forgotten
The Court has long recognized that unions possess First Amendment rights and
that these rights are inextricably linked to a union’s ability to collect and spend member
dues. 109 Perhaps the earliest instance was in 1949 in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 110 a case involving the legality of the “closed-shop”
agreement. Unions and union members collectively challenged a North Carolina statute
and Nebraska constitutional amendment that prohibited employers from denying
employment opportunities based on union membership. They alleged that these laws
violated their “right of freedom of speech, of assembly and of petition guaranteed unions
and their members by ‘the First Amendment and protected against invasion by the state
under the Fourteenth Amendment.’” 111 The Court rejected the contention on the ground
that a closed shop was not “‘indispensable to the right of self organization . . . [and] to
achievement of sufficient union membership to put unions and employers on a full
equality for collective bargaining” 112 was not an essential “‘concomitant’ of ‘the right of
employees to assemble into and associate together through labor organizations.’” 113
Nevertheless, in recognizing that the closed shop did not infringe these rights, the Court
assumed that unions and union members had a constitutional and not just statutory right
to assemble and organize to improve their working conditions. 114
In Street, the Court explicitly recognized that unions and union members
possessed First Amendment rights as unions and union members. While the Court spoke
at great length about safeguarding the rights of dissenting employees who objected to
their dues being used for political purposes, it also rejected an injunctive remedy as an

108

See Brian Olney, Note, Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deception? When Government “Subsidies”
Silence Political Speech, 4 U.C. Irv. L. Rev. 882 (2014) (noting that union political activity is essential to
their mission of protecting working and middle class people’s interests and voice in the political process
and discussing the First Amendment right of workers to raise money through payroll deduction).
109
As many have observed, the Court has paid less attention in recent years to these rights, focusing instead
on the rights of dissenters. See, e.g., Garden, supra note 8, at 32–39.
110
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 527-37 (1949).
111
Id. at 528–29.
112
Id. at 530.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 531 (“The constitutional right of workers to assemble, to discuss and formulate plans for
furthering their own self interest in jobs cannot be construed as a constitutional guarantee that none shall
get and hold jobs except those who will join in the assembly or will agree to abide by the assembly's
plans.”)
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appropriate form of remedial relief on the grounds that it would substantially impinge a
union and the majority of its members from engaging in a variety of political activities:
[M]any of the expenditures involved in the present case are made for the
purpose of disseminating information as to candidates and programs and
publicizing the positions of the unions on them. As to such expenditures
an injunction would work a restraint on the expression of political ideas
which might be offensive to the First Amendment. For the majority also
has an interest in stating its views without being silenced by the
dissenters. 115
In Street, therefore, the Court recognized that laws restricting the ability of a group to
spend money in the name of protecting the speech rights of dissenters also restricts the
speech of the majority. 116
Yet, in the years following Street, the Court gave less emphasis to unions and
their members possessing constitutional rights. Rather, in the context of challenges to the
“open-shop,” the Court developed a body of case law attentive to the First Amendment
rights of dissenters only. These rights were persistently and precariously balanced against
the statutory rights of unions and Congress’ desire to promote labor peace through its
adoption of this statutory scheme. Nowhere is this more evident than in Harris where
Justice Alito, reiterating sentiments he had last raised in Knox, stated that “‘preventing
nonmembers from free-riding on the union’s efforts’ is a rationale ‘generally insufficient
to overcome First Amendment objections,’ and in this respect, Abood is ‘something of an
anomaly.’” 117 However, as Justice Scalia noted in Lehnert, agency fees are justified
because of the free rider problem that the duty of fair representation creates, 118 and
115

Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961).
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1035 (stating that the Court recognized that protecting
dissenters within the entity does not justify restricting the First Amendment rights of the entity to spend
money because it gives the government power to restrict the speech activities of the entity).
117
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2621 (2014).
118
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991). Justice Scalia explained the
constitutional dimensions of the free rider problem:
116

Our First Amendment jurisprudence therefore recognizes a correlation between the rights and the duties of
the union, on the one hand, and the nonunion members of the bargaining unit, on the other. Where the state
imposes upon the union a duty to deliver services, it may permit the union to demand reimbursement for
them; or, looked at from the other end, where the state creates in the nonmembers a legal entitlement from
the union, it may compel them to pay the cost. The “compelling state interest” that justifies this
constitutional rule is not simply elimination of the inequity arising from the fact that some union activity
redounds to the benefit of “free-riding” nonmembers; private speech often furthers the interests of
nonspeakers, and that does not alone empower the state to compel the speech to be paid for. What is
distinctive, however, about the “free riders” who are nonunion members of the union's own bargaining unit
is that in some respects they are free riders whom the law requires the union to carry-indeed, requires the
union to go out of its way to benefit, even at the expense of its other interests. In the context of bargaining,
a union must seek to further the interests of its nonmembers; it cannot, for example, negotiate particularly
high wage increases for its members in exchange for accepting no increases for others. Thus, the free
ridership (if it were left to be that) would be not incidental but calculated, not imposed by circumstances
but mandated by government decree.
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Justice Alito in Harris was careful not to reject the free rider rationale entirely, but rather
simply to find there was no significant free rider problem in the particular case of Illinois
home care workers. When there is a significant free rider problem, Justice Alito’s
analysis, like many Supreme Court cases before Harris, will compel recognition of the
First Amendment rights of unions or union members. Abood might still evoke animosity
but it would surely not be treated as an anomaly.
Another union dues case in which the Court implicitly acknowledged that unions
might possess First Amendment rights in regard to their membership dues was Davenport
v. Washington Educational Association. 119 In Davenport, a public sector union
representing Washington’s public educational employees was sued by the State and by
nonmembers who charged the union with violating a provision of the Fair Campaign
Practices Act, a state initiative approved by Washington voters in 1992 that prohibited
unions from “mak[ing] contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to
operate a political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by [nonmembers].” 120 The
Washington Supreme Court held that the initiative “upset[] the balance of members’ and
nonmembers’ rights” and violated the First Amendment because it “impermissibly
shift[ed] to the union the burden of the nonmembers’ rights,” which had “the practical
effect of inhibiting one group’s political speech (the union and supporting nonmembers)
for the improper purpose of increasing the speech of another group (the dissenting
nonmembers).” 121 The Court expressly connected the “weight of the administrative
burden” that the initiative imposed on the union, with the ability of union members to
assert their “collective political voice.” 122 Additionally, the Court stated that the
initiative’s opt-in requirement, in regulating “the relationship between the union and
agency fee payers with regard to political activity,” 123 undermined the unions’ expressive
associational rights pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts v. Dale.
In a 9–0 opinion, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the Court reversed,
concluding that the restriction imposed by the initiative was “of no great constitutional
concern” because Washington could have gone much further by either restricting agencyfees to the amount devoted to collective bargaining or by “eliminat[ing] agency fees
entirely.” 124 In other words, since Washington could have become a right-to-work state, a
statute creating an opt-in regime rather than the opt-out rule typically followed
under Abood was permissible. Moreover, the Court rejected the balancing approach
pursued by the lower courts, stating that this interpretation extended the “agency-fee
cases . . . well beyond their proper ambit” because unions have “no constitutional
Id.
119

Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 190 (2007).
Id. at 182.
121
State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130 P.3d 352, 359 (2006).
122
Id. at 360.
123
Id. at 362.
124
Davenport, 551 U.S. at 184 (2007).
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entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees.” 125 The crucial aspect of the Court’s
reasoning was its view that the Washington statute did not restrict the way that a union
spent its money by requiring nonmember approval. Rather, the statute restricted use of
dues, which the Court characterized as “other people’s money.” 126
Because the assertion that the statute regulated expenditure of other people’s
money was so essential to the reasoning, Justice Scalia acknowledged that the union
“might have had a point if, as it suggests at times, the statute burdened its ability to spend
the dues of its own members” and not just the dues of nonmembers. 127 His opinion for
the Court further noted that if the union were restricted from spending its members’ dues,
the expressive associational rights of unions would be at stake. In support of this
assertion, Justice Scalia cited Boy Scouts v. Dale, which suggests the Court recognized
unions as expressive associations with First Amendment rights. 128 Implicitly, then, the
Court recognized the possibility of a First Amendment dimension to a statute that
burdened the union’s ability to use “its” money and expressly connected this to a
somewhat newer body of case law regarding expressive associations. We turn now to
those cases and explain why they are implicated by any legal rule, such as the one
adopted in Harris, that regulates how a union spends money it collects from its members.
B. Freedom of Association, The Association, and Unions as Expressive
Associations
At least since the Supreme Court’s landmark 1958 decision in NAACP v.
Alabama, 129 the Court recognized that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group
association” 130 and declared it “beyond debate” that freedom of association was an
“inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” 131 The right of association unfolded,
then, not as an “independent, cognate right, but rather as a means to enable free
speech.” 132 Moreover, organizations serve as a means for individuals to best effectuate
their shared goals such that an organization’s values mirror its members’. 133
125

Id. at 185.
Id. at 187.
127
Id. at 187, n. 2.
128
Id.
129
NAACP v. State of Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
130
Id. at 460.
131
Id.
132
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 Yale L.J. 978, 985 (2011); see also John D. Inazu, The
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 Tul. L. Rev. 565, 568 (2010) (“This core role of assembly and its
broad appeal to groups of markedly different ideologies makes it a better ‘fit’ than the right of association
within our nation's legal and political heritage.").
133
This mirroring underscores the basis for associational standing, which does not treat an entity as
autonomous from its members, but rather as representative. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
126
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Nearly thirty years later, in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, which involved a challenge to
the Jaycees’ bylaws forbidding all women and some men (those of a certain age) from
acquiring full membership in the organization, associational rights were similarly framed
“as an indispensable means of preserving other liberties.” 134 Delineating between two
types of constitutionally protected freedoms of association, “intimate” and “expressive,”
the Court stated that expressive association, wherein individuals decide to associate “in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends,” 135 enjoyed constitutional protection because it facilitated an individual’s exercise
of her First Amendment rights. 136 The value of protecting collective efforts on behalf of
common goals was further linked to preserving diversity of thought by ensuring that
potentially unpopular and dissident viewpoints had a forum for being heard. 137
While the Court recognized that the Jaycees participated in a range of First
Amendment activities, it ultimately found “no basis in the record for concluding that
admission of women as full voting members w[ould] impede the organization’s ability to
engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.” 138 The local
chapters of the Jaycees were large and basically unselective groups. Other than sex and
age, no criteria existed for judging applicants, and new members were recruited and
admitted with no inquiry into their backgrounds. Moreover, nonmembers were able to
participate in social functions and attend meetings. Thus, even if requiring the Jaycees to
conform to the Human Rights Act would “interfere with the internal organization or
affairs of the group,” the Court found these interferences to be minor and therefore not
likely to “impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that
brought them together.” 139
In the years immediately following Jaycees, several legal challenges were brought
against organizations pursuant to antidiscrimination statutes, providing the Court with
ample opportunities to develop further its notion of what constituted expressive
association. In Board of Directors of Rotary Club International v. Rotary Club, a case
challenging the International Rotary Club’s all-male membership policy, the Court
acknowledged that while the Clubs participated “in a variety of commendable service
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (“Thus we have recognized that an association has standing to bring
suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”).
134
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
135
Id. at 622. The Court additionally acknowledged instances in which intimate and expressive association
coincided and singled out instances “when the State interferes with individuals' selection of those with
whom they wish to join in a common endeavor” as a prime example. Id. at 618.
136
Id. (“An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of
grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed”).
137
Id. at 622.
138
Id. at 627–28.
139
Id. at 623.
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activities . . . protected by the First Amendment,” 140 requiring the California branches to
adhere to California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act did not substantially infringe the ability of
the organization to participate in these activities: “[The Act]. . . does not require [the
Rotary Clubs] to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards
in all vocations, good will, and peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their
classification system or admit members who do not reflect a cross section of the
community.” 141 Thus, any infringement that existed was ultimately too weak to defeat the
State’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination and promoting gender equality.
Likewise, in New York State Club Association v. City of New York, which
involved a legal challenge brought by an association of private associations contesting an
amendment to New York’s Civil Rights statute, the Court held that requiring the
associations to adhere to the statute did not “affect ‘in any significant way’ the ability of
individuals to form associations that will advocate public or private viewpoints.” 142 More
recently, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, where the Court
upheld the Solomon Amendment, which required law schools to allow military recruiters
on their campuses, the Court stated that the law did not violate the First Amendment
because students and faculty remained “free to associate to voice their disapproval of the
military's message” and “nothing about the statute affect[ed] the composition of the
group by making group membership less desirable.” 143
In each of these cases, then, the substance and scope of what constituted
expressive association was defined in relation to infringements that either made it more
difficult for organizations to participate in First Amendment activities for which they had
been formed, or which made membership less attractive, or which made it more onerous
for an organization to express its values internally as well as publicly. In Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, for example, a turning point in the
Court’s expressive association jurisprudence, the Court held that Boston’s St. Patrick’s
Day parade could exclude a group formed by gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of
Irish Americans because a parade was “a form of expression, not just motion” 144 and
when its organizers selected the parade’s “expressive units,” they were acting like a
“composer” creating a score. To force the parade organizers to include groups that
conveyed a message at odds with the organizer’s vision was therefore unconstitutional.
What began as a freedom of individuals to associate in furtherance of their shared
goals and aspirations gradually morphed into a freedom of the “association qua
association.” 145 The notion of an entity enjoying First Amendment protection severed
140
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Id. at 548.
142
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from its members, and potentially substantively distinct from its members, was indeed
central to the Court’s holding in Boy Scouts v. Dale that the forced inclusion of a gay
scoutmaster unconstitutionally infringed the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment rights as an
expressive association. 146 Dispelling the notion that First Amendment protection of
expressive association was available only to advocacy groups, the Court found that a
group need only “engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private,” in
order to come within the ambit of expressive association. The Boy Scouts clearly
satisfied this requirement because they existed to “transmit a system of values” 147 to their
members and the public at large, and the presence of a gay scoutmaster evidently
subverted their ability to do so: “Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very
least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world,
that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” 148
In a telling passage, the Court stated that “associations do not have to associate
for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive
activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.” 149 The Court’s
acknowledgement of an association’s First Amendment rights as somehow autonomous
from its members was further augmented by its suggestion that an organization could
take an official position that was contrary to its members’ interests and yet still protected
by the First Amendment. This expansion of First Amendment protection for expressive
associations aligns with the Court’s expansion of First Amendment protection for
corporate speech.
Unions not only satisfy the Court’s articulation of an expressive association, they
are the paradigmatic expressive association. They are political, expressive, and
associational. They advocate for labor rights, which are—and have always been—civil
rights. As Justice Frankfurter memorably remarked in his dissent in Street: “To write the
history of the Brotherhoods, the United Mine Workers, the Steel Workers, the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the International Ladies Garment Workers, the United
Auto Workers, and leave out their so-called political activities and expenditures for them,
would be sheer mutilation.” 150 Indeed, it was the Court’s recognition of unions as
political that animated its agency-fee jurisprudence. In order to protect dissenters from
subsidizing beliefs that they did not hold, the Court first had to recognize that unions
were creatures of politics and ideology.
Unlike in Boy Scouts where the organization’s stance on allegedly correct sexual
norms was “discovered” in the context of litigation and rested almost entirely upon the
expression “morally straight,” which even the Court conceded was not universally
146
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Id. at 655.
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understood to mean any particular thing, a union’s mission, values, and civic and political
posturing are unavoidably self-evident. The SEIU, for example, adopted its own
constitution in order to broadcast and frame its devotion to workers’ rights. Its preamble
declares that “almost every improvement in the condition of working people has been
accomplished by the efforts of organized labor” and that unions provide the best means
for protecting “the welfare of wage, salary, and professional workers.” 151 And in a
section entitled “Our vision of society,” the virtues of collective action and the
importance of ensuring that workers have a meaningful voice in decisions that affect
them unfold through a series of aphorisms. 152 This mantra is classic political speech that
undoubtedly satisfies the extremely low bar that Justice Rehnquist established in Boy
Scouts regarding how to discern if an association was expressive by nature and therefore
protected under the First Amendment.
Moreover, many of the activities on which the Jaycees Court focused when
defining what constituted an expressive association, including support for political
candidates and lobbying, are routine for unions. Unions propose and back a wide range of
legislation that they believe will benefit the employees they represent and file amicus
briefs in appellate and Supreme Court cases. And as NRTW has gained ground and
strategically deployed ballot initiatives in its fight against labor, unions spend money and
other resources attempting to defeat these initiatives. In 2008, for example, the Colorado
AFL-CIO in collaboration with a coalition of liberal donors entitled Protect Colorado’s
Future, spent close to thirty-five million dollars in an effort to prevent Colorado from
becoming a right-to-work state through the adoption of Initiative 47, or Colorado
Mandatory Labor Union Membership Prohibition Initiative. 153 One could fairly say that
unions have become increasingly political as they’ve become increasingly threatened.
Insofar as the centerpiece of the NLRA is exclusivity, which could be described
as an experiment in compelled association, unions certainly differ from the Boy Scouts,
the Jaycees, and other types of membership organizations, public or private. They are
creatures of a statute with an all-comers policy written into their infrastructure. To this
extent, many of the expressive association cases, which focused on compelled
membership in the context of antidiscrimination statutes and the ways that this
compulsion might infringe an organization’s ability to broadcast its message, may not be
factually analogous. But the Court’s underlying reasoning as to why and at what point
infringements become unconstitutional is nonetheless applicable, because unions, like the
Boy Scouts and the Jaycees, are expressive associations protected under the First
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Service Emps. Int’l Union, CTW, CLC, Constitution and Bylaws (2008), available at
http://www.seiu.org/images/pdfs/Con.BylawsFinal3.4.9.pdf.
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Id.
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Colorado Mandatory Labor Union Membership Prohibition Initiative 47 (2008), Ballotpedia,
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Mandatory_Labor_Union_Membership_Prohibition,_Initiative_47_(2008)
(last visited Oct. 29, 2014).

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss10/74
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1526

32

Fisk and Poueymirou: Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech

Amendment, regardless of whether they also possess unique statutory rights and
obligations. 154
C. Subsidizing Free Riders and Subsidizing Union Speech
Harris held that compelled agency fees violate dissenters’ First Amendment rights
because the fees force dissenters to subsidize speech. As we have shown, unions and their
members also possess their own First Amendment rights. Therefore, under the Harris
rule, the duty of fair representation requires unions and their members to subsidize speech
– bargaining, contract administration, and even lobbying for legislation to benefit
workers – on behalf of nonpaying nonmembers. The majority in Harris acknowledged the
fact of the subsidy but dismissed its significance because the subjects of bargaining are
quite limited under Illinois law and because the union apparently does not have to
represent individual workers in grievance proceedings. This was crucial to the holding
in Harris because, as Justice Scalia explained in Lehnert, “[w]hat is distinctive … about
the free riders who are nonunion members of the union's own bargaining unit is that …
they are free riders whom the law requires the union to carry--indeed, requires the union
to go out of its way to benefit, even at the expense of its other interests. … Thus, the free
ridership (if it were left to be that [without the union’s ability to charge fees]) would be
not incidental but calculated, not imposed by circumstances but mandated by government
decree.” 155 Even if the Harris majority were right about the facts, its argument goes to
the magnitude of the compelled subsidy, not its existence. And the Court has never held
that compelled payments to unions do not violate the First Amendment just because they
are small. Insofar as the Court is willing to treat collective bargaining and germane
activities as speech entitled to First Amendment protection, forcing unions to engage in
these activities without compensation also implicates the First Amendment, first, by
compelling the union to speak on behalf of dissenters and second, by forcing unions to
use members’ dues to subsidize this speech.
154

Additionally, while union members’ First Amendment claims parallel unions’, possibly the force of
members’ claims is slightly different. One can imagine a variety of reasons why a person might decide to
contribute full membership dues to her union, ranging from inertia to self-interest to politics. In a right to
work state, where an individual has a choice between paying nothing and paying full dues – and in a nonright-to-work state where that choice is between an agency fee and full dues – the decision to pay full dues
is potentially legally significant. Indeed, to the extent that an individual voluntarily pays full dues in order
to support her union’s political activities, this payment could be treated as a political expenditure entitled to
vigorous First Amendment protection. During oral argument at the Indiana Supreme Court in Sweeney v.
Zoeller, a companion case to Sweeney v. Pence, brought by the International Union of Operating
Engineers, a local AFL-CIO branch, Justice David proposed a similar argument when he suggested that
“members, not the union itself, are having property taken from them. “You are forcing people who still
want to pay dues to subsidize those who don’t.” See Barb Berggoetz, Right-to-work law: Now in the Hands
of
Indiana
Supreme
Court,
Indy
Star
(Sept.
4,
2014
7:38
AM),
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2014/09/04/indiana-supreme-court-hear-right-workarguments-today/15058763/%20.
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Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 556 (Scalia, J.) (internal punctuation omitted).
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In Sweeney v. Pence, the Seventh Circuit entertained and ultimately rejected
similar First Amendment arguments raised by a union challenging Indiana’s new right-towork law on statutory and constitutional grounds. 156 The union argued that Indiana’s
right-to-work law was unconstitutional because it enabled “free riders to infringe on
union members’ First Amendment free speech rights and . . . allow[ed] free riders to
infringe on the right of union membership,” which implicated associational and assembly
rights protected under the First Amendment. 157 Recognizing that unions have a First
Amendment right to express political and social views, the majority opinion observed
that the stronger of the union’s arguments pertained to how right-to-work laws
“siphon[ed] valuable Union resources away from the Union's political activities.” 158
Thus, the majority acknowledged what might be called a diversion theory: because
unions rely solely on membership dues, “right-to-work laws effectively tax the First
Amendment activities of unions and their members by reducing the amount of money
unions have to spend on First Amendment activity.” 159
However, the majority found this argument “undercut by three long-standing
principles”: first, “unions have no constitutional entitlement to the fees of
nonmembers” 160; second, and “more relevantly, the First Amendment protects the right to
be free from government abridgement of speech but it does not require the government to
assist others in funding the expression of particular ideas, including political ones” 161;
third, and here the majority pointed to Harris, the Supreme Court has both affirmed the
First Amendment interests of dissenters and also indicated that “free-rider arguments are
generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.” 162 Because the decision
not to subsidize a fundamental right does not in itself constitute an infringement of that
right, the majority determined that Indiana’s right-to-work law did not abridge the First
Amendment and should thus be evaluated under rational basis, which the law easily
passed. 163
Judge Wood, dissenting, asserted that federal law preempts Indiana’s right-towork law and that the constitutional questions raised by right-to-work laws need not be
addressed. 164 Since the majority found no federal preemption, however, Judge Wood
suggested that the law’s constitutionality should be evaluated under the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment because it compelled one private party (the union) to give
property to another private party (the dissenting nonmember) in the form of services that
156
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cost money. 165 In this respect, Indiana’s right-to-work law functionally mirrored the state
laws at issue in the IOLTA cases, 166 which compelled clients to donate money to legal
foundations and which the Supreme Court had assessed under the Takings Clause. 167
Rejecting the majority’s contention that a union’s “seat at the bargaining table”
sufficiently compensated the union for having to financially subsidize nonmembers,
Judge Wood emphasized the extraordinary costs that exclusivity imposed upon unions
and the “asymmetry embedded in this system” whereby a union must represent all
workers in a bargaining unit, expending significant financial resources on costly
arbitration and grievance processes, while an individual can decide to opt out entirely of
providing any financial support to the union. 168 As Judge Wood’s noted, this system
generated the kind of “classic ‘free rider’ problem” that exists whenever a collective good
is involved. 169 Because Indiana’s law failed to include a solution to the free rider
problem, the law implicated “issues of constitutional magnitude,” which Judge Wood
likened to “a rule providing that, as a condition of receiving a business license in a city, a
company selling gasoline had to give it away to any customer who did not want to
pay.” 170
Our focus in this Article pertains to the First Amendment issues that arise when
unions are forced to engage in collective bargaining and other germane activities without
just compensation. However, the common ground between our argument and Judge
Woods rests with the role that agency fees play in ensuring that competing constitutional
rights are mutually respected, which we discuss at greater lengths below.
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In an identical challenge to Indiana’s right-to-work law in state court, the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional under the Takings Clause. Sweeney v. Zoeller, No. 45D01–1305–PL–52 (Super. Ct. of
Lake Cnty. Sept. 5, 2013). However, this decision was recently reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court.
Zoeller v. Sweeney, No. 45S00-1309-PL-596, 2014 WL 5783599 (Ind. Nov. 6, 2014). The Court did not
completely reject the argument that the right-to-work law had the effect of a “taking” from the union.
Rather, the Court stated that this effect was not the consequence of state law but of the union’s federal
obligation to represent all employees in a bargaining unit fairly. Furthermore, the Court suggested that this
federal obligation was “optional” insofar as it “occurs only when the union elects to be the exclusive
bargaining agent, for which it is justly compensated by the right to bargain exclusively with the employer.”
Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Rucker emphasized that the majority’s holding did not preclude a future
as-applied challenge to the law and indicated the need for a more developed factual record demonstrating
that the “law operates in such a way as to have actually eliminated or reduced its compensation from dues
or “fair share” payments . . . [and] that upon expiration of a valid union security agreement, [a union] was
unable to operate in a manner that would allow [it] to charge all of its members for the services the Union
provided them. Id. (Rucker, J., concurring). (Whether a union can disclaim its status as exclusive
representative in a right-to-work state is, at best, uncertain. One of us has argued that current labor law
may allow it, but the National Labor Relations Board currently appears to think otherwise. See Fisk &
Sachs, supra note 34 at 866–73.)
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See Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Phillips v. Washington Legal
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V.

Union Representation in the Post-Harris World

Harris is almost certainly not the last word on constitutional challenges to union
representation on the basis of exclusivity and majority rule. One obvious implication of
the Court’s decision in Harris, as the Justices realized at oral argument, is that if payment
of fees to a union is compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment, then
appointment of a union to speak on behalf of dissenting employees would equally appear
to be compelled speech. While the NRTW lawyer backed away from (though did not
disavow) this argument in the Harris oral argument, NRTW has already brought litigation
challenging exclusivity under the Railway Labor Act. 171 On the other side, as we have
shown, once the First Amendment rights of unions and union members are recognized, an
interpretation of the duty of fair representation in a right-to-work state becomes acutely
troubling on constitutional grounds because the confluence of exclusivity and the duty of
fair representation forces unions to provide free legal services to free riders in right-towork states. In this light, the law as it existed in non-right-to-work states prior to Harris
looks like a reasonable accommodation of the competing First Amendment concerns.
The union owes all employees it represents a duty of fair representation, and it can charge
all the cost of its representational services, but it cannot charge dissenters for political
speech unrelated to its role as exclusive bargaining representative.
A. Modifying the Duty of Fair Representation in the Right-to-Work Regime
The judicially created duty of fair representation originally emerged to address
racial discrimination in employment. In Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., the Court
recognized that a union’s power to serve as an exclusive representative came with a
corresponding duty to represent all employees fairly. 172 In a series of cases between 1944
and 1967 when Vaca v. Sipes was decided, the Court continued to develop the substance
of this duty. 173 By the time the Court decided Vaca, establishing a union’s duty to
represent employees in contractual grievance arbitration, the duty of fair representation
was described as “a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals
stripped of traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law,” suggesting
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Serna v. Transp. Workers Union of Am. AFL-CIO, No. 3:2013cv02469 (N.D. Tex., filed June 27,
2013).
172
Steele involved a group of black fireman who accused their union of amending an existing collective
bargaining agreement to exclude them from service, job promotions, and assignments to permanent
vacancies. The Court held that the union had a duty to exercise its power as exclusive representatives in a
nondiscriminatory manner and inferred this duty from the principle of exclusivity. Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 192, 194–97, 207 (1944).
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that it had matured into a federal common law obligation. 174 However, the duty of fair
representation was never intended to force unions to represent nonpaying members for
free. It emerged to protect workers, not to undercut unions.
Although the desire to protect workers from arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith
practices persists, the way that the Court has interpreted this duty, as we have discussed
above, raises robust constitutional concerns in the right-to-work context on a few levels.
Any union operating in a right-to-work state is still obliged to bargain in good faith on
behalf of all employees, including employees who have decided to opt out entirely of
paying any union dues. Therefore, in right-to-work states, unions are required by federal
labor law, and often by state statute, to negotiate and engage in contract arbitration on
behalf of employees who contribute absolutely nothing to the union. 175 And if a
governing collective bargaining agreement incorporates statutory rights, then unions also
have a duty to represent employees in their statutory claims. 176
After Harris, uncompensated union representation itself implicates the First
Amendment because the majority treats things like negotiation over wages as political
and therefore as compelled speech. Under the same logic, then, when unions are required
to engage in such activities on behalf of nonpayers, this also constitutes compelled
speech, only of the union and its members. Secondly, and this is more in keeping with the
diversion theory, when unions are forced to use their general treasury funds to subsidize
the costs of these services, this drains a union’s reserves, directly affecting its abilities to
spend on First Amendment activities including, most importantly, political speech. 177
The Supreme Court analyzes both compelled speech and the regulation of
political expenditures using strict scrutiny. 178 However, prior to Harris no case other than
Knox had used strict scrutiny to evaluate a compelled subsidy, and as both Justice Scalia
noted in a footnote in Johanns and as Robert Post has persuasively in a number articles,
compelled subsidies of speech present different (and, in our view, lesser) First
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Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); see also Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org.,
420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975) (“[W]e have held, by the very nature of the exclusive bargaining representative's
status as representative of all unit employees, Congress implicitly imposed upon it a duty fairly and in good
faith to represent the interests of minorities within the unit.”).
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In Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, Professors Fisk and Sachs contend that this “confluence of
federal and state rules . . . creates an inequity in U.S. labor law that calls for resolution” and suggest three
novel solutions for resolving the resultant inequities. While their focus is statutory, this essay is solely
concerned with the constitutional claims that emerge when unions are forced to use union members’ dues
to subsidize negotiation and contract arbitration. Nonetheless, and as discussed in the conclusion, the
solutions they devise are equally amenable to the constitutional quagmire. Fisk & Sachs, supra note 34 at
859.
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14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 271 (2009).
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See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423–24
(1988); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
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Amendment issues than compelling actual speech. 179 Assuming the Court were to treat
the compelled speech or subsidy effected by the duty of fair representation in the right-towork context as compelled speech, a right-to-work law would be constitutionally viable
only if the government could demonstrate that there was a compelling interest in
requiring unions to continue to negotiate and grieve their nonmembers’ complaints
without receiving just compensation and that this duty was narrowly tailored to effectuate
this interest. We believe that the duty of fair representation and exclusive representation
do serve a compelling governmental interest but that there is no legitimate governmental
interest in requiring a union to do so for free. Rather, it has been settled since the Court
rejected a substantive due process attack on the National Labor Relations Act in 1937180
that the government has an interest in regulating labor relations through a bargaining
agent chosen by a majority but empowered to speak on behalf of all, and also that the
government has a strong and wholly legitimate interest in enabling unions to charge
employees for the services that the union is required by law to provide.
Although there exists a compelling interest in ensuring that all members of a
bargaining unit receive adequate and equal representation by their union and in protecting
dissenters’ First Amendment rights, so, too, is there a compelling interest in protecting
the First Amendment rights of unions and union members. The duty of fair representation
is narrowly tailored to effectuate these competing interests and, by extension, to
effectuate Congress’ broader interest in promoting industrial democracy if it allows the
union to charge all those whom it represents for the cost of doing so. Even the majority
in Sweeney v. Pence suggested that modifying the duty of fair representation in the rightto-work context might be an appropriate solution for protecting a union’s First
Amendment interests. 181 Indeed, it is hard to imagine why Congress would have pursued
exclusivity while at the same time allowing states to statutorily forbid unions from
obtaining compensation for their services. Put another way, why would Congress adopt
such robust federal legislation, which aimed to stabilize labor relations on a national scale
and which “entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized
administrative agency,” 182 while simultaneously ensuring that this statutory scheme could
be entirely undone by the states? To the extent that the duty of fair representation in the
right-to-work context undermines the very spirit and purpose of the NLRA, we believe
that it is both timely and necessary to reconceive the contours of this duty in a context179

Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012); Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 n.8 (2005) (noting that compelled speech “differs substantively from the
compelled subsidy analysis); see also Post, Compelled Subsidization, supra note 77. .
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National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 666 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he dissent has not explained why the proper
remedy would be to strike down Indiana's right-to-work statute rather than striking down or modifying the
federal law imposing on all unions the duty of fair representation, in right-to-work states and non-right-towork states alike.”).
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Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 290 (1986) (citing
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959)).
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specific manner. For example, one can envision a variety of avenues that would offer
better protection for all of the implicated interests, from unions being able to charge on a
case-by-case basis for representational services 183 to members-only bargaining in rightto-work regimes. 184
B. Fair Share Fees – a Reasonable Compromise?
As we have explained, language in the majority opinion in Harris suggested that
at least Justice Alito thinks Abood should be overruled because the line between political
and nonpolitical speech in the public sector setting is too difficult to draw. In his view,
government employee pay and working conditions are political issues because they affect
Medicaid funding and the state budget. If that is right, not only might he think that all
government employment should be strictly on a right-to-work basis but also that public
employee bargaining must be on a members-only basis. If it violates a worker’s First
Amendment right to have the union spend her money to advocate positions in bargaining
with which she disagrees, why does it not violate her rights even more strongly to have
the union speak on her behalf?
We, on the other hand, have argued that there is no First Amendment incursion
when a union collects money to represent employees because the compulsory payment of
agency fees is not speech, does not limit a dissenter’s speech rights, and rather should be
regarded as part of a scheme of economic regulation. (We will leave for another article
the task of explaining why exclusive representation is not compelled speech.)
A variety of relatively extreme positions thus have some First Amendment
support –
Ours: that all the dues objector cases were wrong and there is no First
Amendment problem with contracts requiring all represented employees to pay an
amount equal to full union dues and, in the alternative, that right-to-work laws violate the
First Amendment rights of unions to the extent they compel unions to provide free
representational services to nonpayers.
The current Court’s: that some public employment must be on a right-to-work
basis.
The National Right to Work Committee’s: that all public sector bargaining must
be on a right to work basis and, even more radically, that union representation on the
basis of exclusivity violates the First Amendment.
Perhaps a compromise is in order.
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See, e.g., Cone v. Nevada Serv. Employees Union/SEIU Local 1107, 998 P. 2d. 1178, 1182-83 (Nev.
2000)(holding that a law allowing unions to charge for representational services on a case-by-case
individual basis did not offend Nevada’s right-to-work regime because exclusivity established a “mutuality
of obligation”).
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See Fisk & Sachs, supra note 34 at 866-73.
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In Street, Justice Brennan emphasized that “[t]o attain the appropriate
reconciliation between majority and dissenting interests in the area of political
expression, we think the courts in administering the Act should select remedies which
protect both interests to the maximum extent possible without undue impingement of one
on the other.” 185 By forcing unions to spend “other people’s money,” i.e., their fullpaying members’ dues that have been specifically earmarked for core political speech and
activities, the Court has allowed the First Amendment rights of dissenters to trump the
First Amendment rights of unions and members. Yet, this makes little sense. If a fair
share provision is premised on the idea that one can delineate between what is and is not
political in terms of members’ dues, then why should the financial support that goes to
collective bargaining enjoy greater First Amendment protection than the financial support
that goes to support a political candidate? That is to say, why should the dues that go to
support what the Court itself has framed as less political activities sustain stronger First
Amendment claims than the dues that members have willingly contributed for political
purposes? 186
Although agency-fee provisions were originally designed to protect the First
Amendment rights of nonmembers, once the First Amendment interests of unions and
union members are thrown into the mix, agency-fee provisions acquire even stronger
constitutional support. Arguably, they protect three sets of interests simultaneously:
nonmembers from having to subsidize the political and ideological pursuits of the union,
union members from having to subsidize the political and ideological beliefs of
nonmembers, and unions who strive to protect their workers’ interests and can only do so
when they are able to fully participate in the political landscape. To this extent, then, and
to borrow the language of strict scrutiny, agency fees are narrowly tailored or the least
restrictive means of effectuating these competing interests.
VI.

Conclusion

Unions are one of a number of organizations that are empowered and required by
law to speak on behalf of people and also are one of a number on which regulatory
regimes rely to provide services and manage people. They are similarly not unique in
using money raised from those whom they represent to speak and act on behalf of those
whom they represent. But unions are in a class by themselves in terms of the legal
185

Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961).
Harris, of course, suggests that the division between political and nonpolitical expenditures is difficult if
not impossible to draw in the public sector context. Thus, Harris subverts what we have been referring to as
a diversion theory whereby money intended for one type of activity transforms into a subsidy for another
type of activity that enjoys less First Amendment protection than the first. However, until Abood is
overturned, it is Harris and not Abood that is the anomaly. And regardless, in right-to-work states, public
and private sector unions are both forbidden from including agency fees in their collective bargaining
agreements, and even the Harris majority recognized that in the private sector, bargaining over wages is not
political.
186

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss10/74
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1526

40

Fisk and Poueymirou: Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech

controversy around their status as representatives and, especially, their ability to charge
fees for the services they provide. We have argued that the First Amendment controversy
about union fees was misguided from the start, and Harris v. Quinn made it substantially
worse.
While, in our view, the requirement to pay for legal services is not compelled
speech, the Court’s entire agency fee jurisprudence, including Harris, insists that it is. If
this is the case, however, laws and contracts that require unionized employees to pay for
union representational services compel speech of dissenters exactly to the same extent
that their prohibition compels speech of unions and their members. Once the First
Amendment rights of unions and union members are recognized, agency fee or fair share
provisions emerge as a constitutionally sound accommodation of the interests of
dissenters, unions, and union members.
Many in the labor community believe that the Supreme Court’s assault on agency
fees—and unions more generally—suggests that unions must strive to convert agency fee
payers into full-paying members. The SEIU and AFL-CIO have been engaged in
aggressive and largely successful efforts to do just that. And, as we have argued, unions
and union members possess strong First Amendment claims and, we believe, now is the
time to begin developing these claims in the context of litigation. Thus, while the Court
may have turned its back on labor, we remain hopeful that this might generate positive
effects for the movement.
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